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R. LOCKE BELLI*

J.

HONG,

PHILIPPE SHIN, AND

This Article reviews international law developments in the field of
aerospace and defense industries in 2016.2
I.

Modernization of Export Control Enforcement

At a regulatory level, 2016 reflected substantial continuity with the
reforming, activist trend that has characterized United States export controls
in recent years. Agency leadership, particularly in the United States
Department of Commerce's Bureau of Industry and Security, has continued
to push an agenda of regulatory regime interoperability and modernization.
The State Department also continued its push to automate and simplify
agency interactions with industry, releasing or announcing new automated
forms and processes for common export-control interactions. Concurrently,
regulators and enforcement authorities remained vigilant and active, with
increasing expectations for compliance program robustness and systems
automation, and the announcement of a new voluntary self-disclosure
program by the Department of Justice (DOJ) for export controls and
sanctions violations. The result of the November 2016 election, however,
introduces a degree of uncertainty into the prospects for continuing United
States export controls reform. Particularly given the Trump administration's
deep critique of current United States trade and national security policies,
there is potential for retrenchment or a change in direction commencing in
2017.
* R. Locke Bell of Morrison & Foerster LLP served as the editor of the Aerospace and
Defense Industries Committee's Year in Review for 2016. Randy Cook, Francesca Harker, and
Waqas Shahid, of Ankura Consulting Group, LLC, authored Section I on the Modernization of
Export Control Enforcement and Section IV on the Increased Enforcement of Anti-Corruption
Laws. Nicholas J. Spiliotes, Aki Bayz, and Felix Helmstaedter, of Morrison & Foerster LLP
authored Section II, titled Export Controls Update: United States and European Union

Sanctions Against Iran and North Korea. Tak-Kyun Hong and Philippe Shin, of Shin & Kim,
authored Section m on Developments in Korean Military Procurement and the Impact of a
New Anti-Corruption Act.
2. For developments in 2015, see R. Locke Bell et al., Aerospace and Defense Industries, 50
INr'L LAw. 289 (2016). For developments in 2014, see William M. Pannier et al., Aerospace and

Defense Industries, 48 INr' LAw. 231 (2015).
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EXPORT

CONTROL REFORM

RELOADED

In 2016, export control reforms (ECR) focused on further integration of
the State Department-administered International Traffic in Arms'
Regulations (ITAR) with the Commerce Department's Export
Administration Regulations (EAR) and refinement of the United States
Munitions List (USML). Among other reforms, the following were
implemented:
* The definitions of "export," "reexport," "release," and "retransfer" in
ITAR Part 120 were modified or added in order to harmonize with the
EAR's preference for more specific description of transaction types. In
practice, these refinements have limited impact, as all of these
transactions, when involving defense articles, continue to require
specific authorization under the ITAR.3
* New ECR rules were published for USML Categories XII (fire
control / lasers / sensors / night vision), XIV (toxicological agents),
and XVIII (directed energy weapons), while revised rules were issued
for Categories VIII (aircraft) and XIX (gas turbine engines).4
* ITAR Parts 123 and 124 were amended to make clear that ITAR
licenses and agreements are issued in reliance upon the representations
and information in the transmittal letter and other documentations
supporting the application.5 These provisions effectively serve to limit
the scope of any license to the terms articulated in the license
application, regardless of whether those limitations are expressed as
provisos or other stated scope limitations in the approved license.6
* A new ITAR exemption was created for release of technical data to a
person traveling overseas, provided that person would otherwise be
authorized to receive the data.7 This reform addresses the sort of
technical violation that previously occurred when a United States
person (or authorized non-United States person) traveling overseas
received an email containing technical data.8
3. See International Traffic in Arms Regulations: Revisions to Definition of Export and
Related Definitions, 81 FR 35611-01 (June 3, 2016) (to be codified at 22 C.F.R. pts. 120, 12326.
4. See Amendment to the International Traffic in Arms Regulations: U.S. Munitions List
Categories VIII and X[X, 81 FR 6797-01 (Feb. 9, 2016) (to be codified at 22 C.F.R. pt. 121);
Amendment to the International Traffic in Arms Regulations: Revision of U.S. Munitions List
Category XII, 81 Fed. Reg. 70340 (Oct. 12, 2016) (to be codified at 22 C.F.R. pt. 121);
Amendment to the International Traffic in Arms Regulations: Revision of U.S. Munitions List
Categories XIV and XVIII, 81 FR 49531-01 (uly 28, 2016) (to be codified at 22 C.F.R. pt.
121).
5. 22 C.F.R. §§ 123.28, 124.1 (2016).
6. 22 C.F.R. $§ 123.28, 124.1 (2016).
7. 22 C.F.R. § 125.4(b)(9) (2016).
8. Id.
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Concurrent with these regulatory reforms, the agencies continued to focus
on modernization and integration. In November, the State Department's
Directorate of Defense Trade Controls (DDTC) transitioned from the
previous manual submission process for commodity jurisdiction requests to
an automated workflow submission platform.9 DDTC intends to continue
this automation initiative in 2017 with a transition from its legacy "DTrade"
license submission platform to a future Defense Export Control and
Compliance System (the DECCS), which is to replace the current series of
"DSP" license varieties with a single automated authorization form.o
Similarly, the current manual processes for submitting registration materials,
advisory opinion requests, and disclosures are each to be replaced with
automated modules in the DECCS.11
B.

ENFORCEMENT DEVELOPMENTS AND COMPLIANCE
EXPECTATIONS

Enforcement authorities were highly active in 2016. The most intriguing
development was DOJ's initiation of a new voluntary self-disclosure process
for export control and sanctions violations. This process, administered by
DOJ's National Security Division, Counterintelligence and Export Control
(CES) Section, complements DOJ's guidelines for assessing corporate
cooperationl2 and is intended to encourage industry to voluntarily disclose
directly to DOJ where they become aware of willful or otherwise egregious
violations.s3 It is unclear how this process will interact with DDTC's and

BIS's existing voluntary self-disclosure processes. Will DOJ give credit for
self-disclosures made to the regulatory agencies, but not to CES? Will
information provided to CES make its way to the regulatory agencies?
What is clear is that DOJ is focused on increasing its opportunities to
prosecute cases in this issue area and is dissatisfied with the information it
has historically received out of the regulatory disclosure processes.
BIS's Office of Export Enforcement (OEE) continued to increase
enforcement activity. In 2016, OEE issued 53 percent more administrative
fines than in 2015.14 The agency also doubled the number of individuals
arrested for export control and sanctions violations.1s OEE's principal focus
9. U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, DIRECTORATE OF DEFENSE TRADE CONTROLS,

OMB

Approval

No. 1405-0163, DS-4076 COMMoorrY JuRIsIoCTrON (CJ) DETERMINATION FORM.
10. DECCS Information Center, U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, http://www.pmddtc.state.gov/DTASOnline/deccsjinfo.htm (last updated Jan. 31, 2017).

11. Id.
12. Memorandum from Sally Quillian Yates, Deputy Attorney General, U.S. Dep't of Justice

(Sept. 9, 2015) (on file with the U.S. Dep't ofJustice).
13. U.S.

DEP'T OF

STATE,

VOLUNTARY SELF-DISCLOSURES,

NATIONAL

SECURITY

DiviSION,

GUIDANCE

REGARDING

COOPERATION, AND REMEDIATION IN ExPORT CONTROL

AND SANCTIONS INVESTIGATIONS INVOLVING BUSINESs ORGANIZATIONs (Oct. 2, 2016).

14. Douglas Hassebrock, Director, Office of Enf't, Address at the Update 2016 Conference

on Export Controls and Policy (Nov. 1, 2016).
15. Id.
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continues to be on illegal exports to Iran, with those cases representing over
half of its enforcement caseload.16 Also, investigation of illegal exports to
Russia and Ukraine were a growing share of OEE's activity.'7
DDTC was active as well. On the consent agreement front, DDTC
announced three new consent agreements, in contrast to zero in 2015. It
also announced its intent to articulate qualification and performance
standards and, possibly, a training regimen for future Special Compliance
Officers (SCOs) in order to address industry concern regarding varying
approaches taken by different SCOs in the past.1s DDTC also initiated a
new form of enforcement agreement, the "oversight agreement," which is
apparently intended to provide a less-intrusive, more tailored enforcement
oversight option.'9 Finally, the agency also gained significantly stiffer civil
penalty authority in 2016, with the maximum assessment for each regulatory
violation more than doubling to over $1 million.20
With regard to compliance expectations, DDTC compliance officials
speaking at industry events articulated several specific elements they believe
are hallmarks of an effective export compliance program, including the
following:
* Centralized oversight of the international trade compliance function
by the corporate parent.
* Automation of recurrent compliance processes and transactions, and
integration of disparate processes into compliant systems. For
example, export transactions conducted in a company's Enterprise
Resource Planning system should automatically interact with
classification information for the subject technology or hardware, the
company's export authorization management system, and a screening
function for denied parties.
* Development of detailed, automated processes to manage export
authorization administrative requirements.
* Engaging engineers and other technical subject matter experts in
deliberate jurisdiction and classification of technology and hardware.
* An investigation and disclosure process that proactively identifies
regulatory violations, conducts effective root cause analysis, and scopes
reviews and corrective actions to identify and address similar issues
across the company.

16. Id.
17. Id.
18. Chad Leezer, Compliance Specialist, Office of Def. Trade Controls Compliance, Address
to the 2016 Fall International Trade Export Licensing & Compliance Conference: Consent
Agreements (Oct. 25, 2016); see also DDTC Penalty and Oversight Agreements, U.S. DEP'T OF
STArE, http://pmddtc.state.gov/compliance/poa.htnl (last updated Oct. 5, 2016).
19. Id.
20. See U.S. Dri'T OF STATE, DDTC Crvw PENALTY INFLATION ADJUSTMENTS (2016).
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* An accountable, auditable process for effective implementation of
corrective actions.21

The impending change in presidential administrations will likely affect the
current approach to United States export controls and pace of ECR. But the
direction and nature of this influence remains unclear. In the short term, the
generally technical nature of ECR and the agencies' ongoing regulatory
activities will likely insulate the issue area from drastic, immediate change.
II. Export Controls Update: United States and European Union
Sanctions Against Iran and North Korea
This Article summarizes changes during 2016 to sanctions laws of the
United States, administered by the United States Department of Treasury
Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) and the European Union with
respect to Iran and North Korea.22
A.

IRANIAN SANcTIONs REGIME FOLLOWING

JCPOA

IMPLEMENTATION

The announcement by the International Atomic Energy Agency on
January 16, 2016,23 that the Government of Iran satisfied its commitments
under the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA),24 triggered
"Implementation Day" and the lifting of Iran sanctions as detailed in the
JCPOA. The immediate general impact of Implementation Day under the
United States sanctions regime was the lifting of the nuclear-related
"secondary sanctions."25 But United States "primary sanctions" applicable to
United States persons and Iranian transactions that have a United States
nexus remain in full force and effect. The EU's commitments under the
21. Leezer, supra note 18; see also U.S. D.r'T OF STAT, BUREAU OF POLITICAL MILITARY
DIRECTORATE OF DEFENSE TRADE CONTROLS OFFICE OF
CONTROLs COMPLIANCE, DDTC COMPLIANCE PROGRAM GuioELINES.

AFFAIRs

DEFENSF.

TRADE

22. Though beyond the scope of this article, the United States instituted a number of other
reforms to its export controls sanctions regime, including further liberalizing the sanctions in
effect against Cuba and terminating sanctions against Myanmar (formerly Burma) and C6te

d'Ivoire (or Ivory Coast).
23. Int'l Atomic Energy Agency [IAEA], Verification and Monitoring in the Islamic Republic of
Iran in light of United Nations Security Council Resolution 2231 (2015), IAEA Doc. No. GOV/
INF/2016/1 Gan. 16, 2016).
24. The full text of the JCPOA is available on the United States Department of State website,
see joint Comprehensive Plan ofAction, U.S. DrP'T oF STATE, http://www.state.gov/e/eb/tfs/spil

iran/jcpoaI (last visited Apr. 3, 2017).
25. Secondary sanctions generally are directed toward non-United States persons for specified
conduct involving Iran that occurs entirely outside of United States jurisdiction. See U.S.
DEFT OF TREASURY & U.S. DEF'-r OF STATE, GutoANCE RELATING TO TI-IE LIFING OF
CERTAIN UNITED STATES SANCTIONS PURSUANT TO THE JOINT COMPREHENSIVE PLAN OF

ACTION ON IMPLEMENTATION DAY at 2 n.3 (Jan. 16, 2016). The specific United States
commitments are set forth in Sections 4.1-4.7 of Annex Hand Sections 17.1-17.2 of Annex V of

the JCPOA.
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JCPOA were significantly broader and effectively lifted the substance of its
economic and financial sanctions imposed in relation to the Iranian nuclear
program, with only a limited number of restrictive measures, including the
listing of certain individuals and entities, remaining in effect under the EU
Iran sanctions.26 This extraordinary event significantly altered the United
States and EU sanctions in effect against Iran, opening the opportunity for
Iran to reengage with the global economy and for non-United States
companies to engage in business with Iran.

B.

UNITED STATES SANCTIONS

1.

Removal of Nuclear Related Secondary Sanctions

Under its JCPOA commitments, the United States government lifted the
nuclear-related secondary sanctions imposed against Iran under various
United States laws.27 As a result, non-United States persons and entities can

engage in activities that were previously subject to United States sanctions,
including transactions in the following sectors: finance and banking;
insurance; energy and petrochemicals; shipping, shipbuilding and ports; gold
and other precious metals; software and metal; and automotive. Prior to
Implementation Day, the United States could sanction non-United States
persons that engaged in transactions with Iran in these sectors, or
transactions with persons or entities identified on OFAC's listing of
Specially Designated National and Blocked Persons (SDNs).28 As part of its
JCPOA commitments OFAC removed approximately 400 Iranian entities
and persons from the SDN list. However, approximately 200 Iranian SDNs
remain on the

list.29

26. The specific EU commitments are set forth in Sections 4.1-4.7 of Annex II and Sections

16.1-16.4 of Annex V of the JCPOA.
27. The primary United States laws that impose secondary sanctions on Iran include:
Comprehensive Iran Sanctions, Accountability, and Divestment Act of 2010, Pub. L. 111-195,

124 Stat. 1312 (2010); Iran and Libya Sanctions Act of 1996, Pub. L. 104-172, 110 Stat. 1541
(1996); Iran Threat Reduction and Syria Human Rights Act of 2012, Pub. L. 112-158, 126 Stat.
1214 (2012); National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2012, Pub. L. 112-81, § 1245,
125 Stat. 1298, 1311 (2011); National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2013, Pub. L.
112-239, §§ 1241-55, 126 Stat. 1632, 2004 (2013); and various Executive Orders (E.O.s),
including, Exec. Order No. 13574, 76 F.R. 30,505 (May 23, 2011); Exec. Order No. 13590, 76
F.R. 72,609 (Nov. 20, 2011); Exec. Order No. 13622, 77 F.R. 45,897 (July 30, 2012); Exec.
Order No. 13628, 77 F.R. 62,139 (Oct. 9, 2012); Exec. Order No. 13645, 78 F.R. 33,945 (une
3, 2013).
28. The full SDN list, which is updated regularly, is available at https://
sanctionssearch.ofac.treas.gov/. See Sanctions List Search, OFFICE
or FOREIGN ASSETS
CONTROL, https://sanctionssearch.ofac.treas.gov/ (last visited Apr. 4, 2017). In addition, any
entity that is 50 percent or more owned by one or more SDNs is also considered an SDN even
if not specifically identified on the SDN list. See U.S. DEP'T OF TREASURY, OFFICE OF
FORESIGN AssETs CONTROL, REVISED GuIDANCE ON ENTrTIEs OWNED 13v PERSONS WHOSE
PROPERTY AND INTERESTS IN PROPERTY ARE BLOCKED (2014).

29. Sanctions List Search, OFFICE OF FOREIGN
sanctionssearch.ofac.treas.gov/ (last visited Apr. 4, 2017).
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Since 2012, United States sanctions prohibited foreign subsidiaries owned
or controlled by a United States person from engaging in transactions,
directly or indirectly, with Iran and any person subject to the jurisdiction of
the Government of Iran that would be prohibited if undertaken by a United
States person. 30 Consistent with its JCPOA commitments, OFAC issued
General License H (GL H) that expressly authorizes non-United States
subsidiaries of United States persons to engage in Iran-related transactions
and permits United States persons to establish operating procedures to
implement the activities covered by GL H.31 In addition, GL H authorizes a
United States person to make available to its owned or controlled nonUnited States entities that may be engaged in Iran-related transactions any
"automated" and "globally integrated" computer, accounting, email,
telecommunications, or other business support system, platform, database,
application, or server necessary to store, collect, transmit, generate, or
otherwise process documents or information related to the Iran transactions
of the non-United States owned or controlled entity.32 However, this
authorization does not extend to cover any systems used to transfer funds
through the United States financial system. 33
2.

Continuation of Primary and Certain Secondary Sanctions

The "primary" sanctions in effect against Iran-that is, sanctions that
apply to transactions that have a United States nexus-remain in full force
and effect.34 Additionally, notwithstanding the JCPOA commitments, the
United States retains certain secondary sanctions and OFAC can sanction
non-United States persons and entities that engage in transactions (a) with
Iranian SDNs35 or (b) that materially contribute to the ability of Iran to
develop weapons of mass destruction and support acts of terrorism.36

30. Iran Threat Reduction and Syria Human Rights Act of 2012, Pub. L. 112-158, 126 Stat.
1214, 1234 (2012).
31. U.S. DEP'T OF TREASURY, OFFICE OF FOREIGN ASSETS CONTROL, GENERAL LICENSE
H: AUTHORIZING CERTAIN TRANSACTIONS RELATING TO FOREIGN ENTITIES OWNED OR
CONTROLLED 13Y A UNITED STATES PERSON 1 (2016).

32. Id.
3 3. Id. at 2.
34. These sanctions are primarily set forth in the Iranian Transactions

and Sanctions

Regulations (ITSR), 31 C.F.R. pt. 560 (2016). A transaction will generally have a United States
nexus if it involves a United States person, United States goods, technology or services, or use
of the United States financial system.

35. National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2013, Pub. L. 112-239, § 1241(c)(1),
126 Stat. 1632, 2006-07 (2013).
36. See, e.g., Comprehensive Iran Sanctions, Accountability, and Divestment Act of 2010, Pub.

L. 111-195, §§ 105, 105A, 105B, 124 Stat. 1312, 1335 (2010); and Exec. Order No. 13553, 75
F.R. 60,567 (Sept. 28, 2010).
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Licensing Policy

To the extent an Iran related activity is prohibited under the ITSR or
other applicable law, an OFAC license is required in order to engage in such
transaction. As a general matter of licensing policy, OFAC will deny such
license applications unless consistent with United States objectives. In
furtherance of its JCPOA commitment, OFAC will license, on a case-bycase basis, United States persons and, where there is a United States
jurisdictional nexus, non-United States persons, to export or transfer to Iran
commercial passenger aircraft and components for exclusively civil aviation
end-use and to provide associated services, provided that licensed items and
services are used exclusively for commercial passenger aviation.37 Such
licenses will include conditions to ensure that licensed activities do not
involve, and no licensed aircraft, goods, or services are re-sold or retransferred to, any person on the SDN list or other sanctioned parties (such
as individuals and entities listed on the Department of Commerce Bureau of
Industry and Security (BIS) Denied Persons List).38
C.

EU SANcTIoNs

The EU sanctions relief, effective January 16, 2016, removed a broad
range of restrictive measures, allowing EU companies to re-engage in
business with Iranian partners in a variety of business areas.39 A certain
number of persons, entities, and bodies have been de-listed from the
applicable EU sanctions lists and their assets have been unfrozen. However,
certain activities remain restricted and the EU also keeps several individuals
and entities on the EU watchlist. EU companies are therefore still obliged
to conduct proper diligence and comply with remaining sanctions law
restrictions as well as general obligations under EU and national export
control laws.40
Financial, Banking and Insurance Measures: Under the softened EU
sanctions regime, most importantly, financial transfers to and from Iran are
permitted and do not need prior authorization, to the extent that the Iranian
persons, entities or bodies involved are not listed on the remaining EU lists
of designated persons, entities, or bodies. At the same time, certain Iranian
37. See U.S. DEP'T OF TREASURY, OFFICE OF FOiRE:IGN ASSETS CONTROL, STATEMENT OF
LICENSING POLICY FOR AcTvIriEs RELATED TO THiF. ExPORT OR RE-ExPORTTo IRAN OF
COMMERCIAL PASSENGER AIRCRAFT AND RELATED PARTS AND SERVICES (2016).

38. See id.
39. The implementation of the EU sanctions relief occurred through several legislative acts
beginning with the measures taken on October 18, 2015 which took effect on Implementation
Day. For a detailed summary, see Information Note on EU sanctions to be lifted under the Joint
Comprehensive Plan ofAction (JCPOA) (Jan. 23, 2016), http://eeas.europa.eu/archives/docs/top
stories/pdf/iran_implementation/information noteeu-sanctions-jcpoa-en.pdf. The descrip-

tion herein is based on the legislative acts cited in the Information Note as well as on the
Information Note itself.
40. See id.
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banks and financial institutions will continue to be listed under the EU
sanctions regime against Iran.41
Oil, Gas and Petrochemical Sectors: It is permissible to import, purchase,
swap and transport crude oil and petroleum products, gas, and
petrochemical products from Iran, and to export equipment or technology
to be used in Iran for business activities in this industry.42
Software: Trade with software and related services are permitted, but
remain subject to a licensing requirement if the software is designed for use
in nuclear or military industries. Authorization may be obtained from the
competent EU Member State authorities.
Other Activities Affected by the EU Sanctions Relief The broad range of
released activities also concerns the shipping, shipbuilding, and transport
sectors, as well as the trade with gold and other precious metals, banknotes,
and coinage. Authorization requirements however remain with respect to
graphite and raw or semi-finished metals.43
Continuation of CertainEU Sanctions: The EU maintains an arms embargo
against Iran and restrictive measures related to missile technology and on
specific nuclear-related transfers and activities, resulting in a set of
prohibited activities and certain authorization requirements. Some of these
restrictions, such as the arms embargo, will only be lifted following
Transition Day as defined by the JCPOA (i.e., October 18, 2023). Further,
restrictive measures imposed by the EU in connection with human rights
violations, support of terrorism, or for other reasons will continue to have
effect.44
Exports from certain EU Member States to Iran, including Germany,
increased in 2016 following Implementation Day, though the overall volume
was smaller than many stakeholders in the industry had expected.45 While
certain large deals have been reported, such as the sale of Boeing and Airbus
airplanes to the Iranian air transport industry, hesitance of the banking
sector and other factors certainly have tempered the expectations to
immediately re-install trade relations as they had existed between many EU
countries and Iran prior to the implementation of the strict sanctions
regime. Further developments will largely depend on whether businesses
can sufficiently rely on the current status of the United States and EU
restrictive measures, which at the end of 2016 is hard to predict.
41. See id.
42. See id.
43. See id.
44. See id.
45. According to figures published by the German-Iranian Chamber of Commerce (DeutschIranische Handelskammer e.V.), exports to Iran increased by approximately 15 percent between
January 2016 to August 2016 compared to the exports in the respective period in 2015, data
available at Exports to Iran Continue to Grow, DEUTSCHl-IRANISCHE HANDELSKAMMER E.V.,
http://www.dihkev.de/de/news/6397-Exporte-nach-Iran-wachsen-weiter (last visited April 4,
2017).
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NORTH KOREA SANCTIONS

In response to North Korea's test of a nuclear weapon and ballistic missile
technology in January and February 2016, on March 2, 2016, the United
Nations Security Council (UNSC) unanimously adopted Resolution 2270.46
The most significant provisions include: crackdown on illicit foreign trade
channels; shipping and transport limitations requiring Member States to
inspect cargo that originated in North Korea for items shipped in violation
of sanctions; limitation of rare earth and other mineral exports from North
Korea; and placing significant restrictions on both North Korean and
Member State financial institutions.47 Member States must prohibit new
North Korean banks in their territories and close existing North Korean
banks in their territories by May 31, 2016, and enhance arms control
measures. 48 On November 30, 2016, the UN Security Council adopted a
new Resolution to impose further restrictive measures as a reaction to North
Korea's nuclear test on September 9, 2016, limiting scientific or technical
cooperation and the number of bank accounts for North Korean diplomatic
missions.49
1.

Implementation by the United States, and Additional United States
Sanctions

The United States already had in place a stringent North Korean
sanctions regime.5
On February 18, 2016, before the United Nations
agreed upon Resolution 2270, the United States enacted The North Korea
Sanctions and Policy Enhancement Act of 20165 that specified both
mandatory and discretionary categories of entities that the President should
sanction.52 The President subsequently issued E.O. 1372253 placing
additional sanctions on North Korea, including the following: blocking all
property or interests of the North Korean government, the Workers' Party
of Korea, and other entities within the United States or within possession or
control of any United States person; prohibiting all exportation from the
United States or by a United States person of any good, service, or
technology to North Korea; and prohibiting approval, financing, facilitation,
or guarantee by any United States person of an action by a foreign person
that would be prohibited under United States law.
46. S.C. Res. 2270 (Mar. 2, 2016).
47. Id. at 11 18, 30, 32, 34.
48. Id. at 1 6.
49. S.C. Res. 2321, T 16 (Nov. 30, 2016).
50. See North Korea Sanctions Regulations (NKSR), 31 C.F.R. pt. 510 (2016).
51. North Korea Sanctions and Policy Enhancement Act of 2016, Pub. L. 114-122, 130 Stat.
93 (2016).
52. For example, there was no discussion of human rights abuses in the Resolution; however,
the NKSPEA requires the President to sanction any entities who were knowingly and
significantly involved in them. See id.
53. Exec. Order No. 13722, 81 F.R. 14,943 (Mar. 15, 2016).
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Implementation by the European Union

The EU maintains restrictive measures against North Korea since the
54
implementation of UN Security Council Resolution 1718 ten years ago. In
2016, following the adoption of UN Resolution 2270, the EU has
implemented restrictive measures in line with the broadened scope of the
UN sanctions regime. In particular, in order to prevent asset flight, the EU
Commission immediately aligned the list of persons and entities subject to
the freeze of assets and continued to add further persons in May 2016.55
The transposition of the more complex new sectoral sanctions included in
UN Resolution 2270 aimed at, amongst others, the prohibition of sale or
supply of aviation fuel and the prohibition to establish new joint ventures
with North Korean banks and the jurisdiction of EU Member States.56 The
Council of the European Union, on May 27, 2016, decided to impose
additional restrictive measures going beyond the prohibitions and
restrictions implemented in transposition of UNSC resolutions (so-called
autonomous sanctions), arguing that it considered North Korea's nuclear
and ballistic tests in early 2016 to be a grave threat to international peace
and security.57 These new measures include (i) prohibitions on the import of
petroleum products, luxury goods and additional dual-use goods from North
Korea, (ii) restrictions of financial support for trade with North Korea or
prohibition on transferring funds to and from the country without prior
authorization, (iii) prohibition on investments by North Korea in the EU
and investments by EU persons in certain sectors in North Korea, and (iv)
obligations of the EU Member States to deny permission to land in, take off
from or overfly their territory to any aircraft operated by North Korean
carriers or originating from North Korea.5
3.

Conclusion

In 2016, apart from its sanctions activities in relation to Iran and North
Korea, the EU decided to extend existing sanctions regimes, particularly
those relating to the Ukraine crises and the conflict in Syria.59 The EU also
54. This resolution was a reaction to North Korea's nuclear test on 9 October 2006 and was
implemented by the Council of the European Union's common position. See Council Common
Position 2006/795/CFSP of 20 November 2006, 2006 OJ. (L 322) 32; Council Regulation
(EC) No. 329/2007 of 27 March 2007, 2007 OJ. (L 88) 1.
55. Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2016/780 of 19 May 2016, 2016 OJ. (L 131)
55 (adding 16 individuals and 12 entities; Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2016/
780 of 4 March 2016, 2016 OJ. (L 60) 62 (adding 18 individuals and one entity).
56. Council Decision (CFSP) 2016/476 of 31 March 2016, 2016 OJ. (L 85) 38; Council
Regulation (EU) 2016/682 of 29 April 2016, 2016 OJ. (L 117) 1.
57. Council Decision (CFSP) 2016/849 of 27 May 2016, 2016 OJ. (L 141) 79; Council
Regulation (EU) 2016/841 of 27 May 2016, 2016 OJ. (L 141) 36.
58. Id.
59. Press Release, EEAS, EU Restrictive Measures in Response to the Crisis in Ukraine (Mar.
16, 2017) (on file with the EEAS); Press Release, European Council, Council of the EU, Syria:
EU Extends Sanctions Against the Regime by One Year (May 27, 2016) (on file with author).
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implemented, for the first time, additional autonomous sanctions targeting
terrorist groups ISIL (Da'esh) and Al-Qaeda.60 Going forward, the UK
European Union membership referendum's result (Brexit referendum) may
however impact future decision making processes, as the UK strongly
supported the implementation of the EU's restrictive measures over the past
years. In the United States, the pending change in President, coupled with
the Republican control of both the United States House of Representatives
and Senate, raises the issue of potential changes in United States sanctions
policies with respect to Iran, Cuba, and potentially other countries.
III. Developments in Korean Military Procurement and the
Impact of a New Anti-Corruption Act
Defense contracts are an area with high risks of corruption, and Korea is
no exception. Large-scale defense contracts typically require a long time to
prepare, execute, and perform, and the process has perennially been plagued
with problems, such as (a) leakage of military secrets (e.g., governmental
plans for introduction of new weapons systems), (b) provision of economic
benefits intended to secure favorable results in various evaluations, and (c)
retired military officers or former public servants being employed by private
businesses to act as agents or consultants, creating problems such as
influence peddling or lobbying.61
Near the end of 2014, the Korean government designated defense
contracts as an area which structurally presents serious irregularities and
launched a "joint investigation team for defense contracting" task force
consisting of about 100 investigators dispatched from the Ministry of
National Defense, the National Police Agency, the Korea Customs Service
and the Prosecutors' Office.62 The task force conducted large-scale
investigations until early 2016 which resulted in the indictment or
prosecution of large numbers of active and retired military officers and
public officials, as well as employees of defense contractors and weapons
consultants.63

Anti-corruption investigations related to defense contracts are likely to
continue in the future, in spite of concerns expressed by some at the
excessive prosecution efforts by the Prosecutors' Office. For example, a
former Navy Chief of Staff was found not guilty by the court after being
indicted on charges of manipulating the procurement process to allow the
60. Press Release, European Council, Council of the EU, Fight Against Terrorism: EU
Strengthens its Legal Arsenal Against ISIL/Da'esh and Al-Qaida (Sept. 20, 2016) (on file with
author).
61. President Park Geun-hye's Commitment to Eradicate Corrupt Practices in the Defense Industry
and Expected Follow-up Measures, YooN & YANG LLC (Nov. 28, 2014), http://www.lexology
.com/library/detail.aspx?g=29034028-0929-4876-b28d-5a2e82354351.
62. Id.
63. Amy Watson, South Korea is Rocked by-Defense Corruption Scandal, Ti m Sco-TSMAN Guly 16,
2015), http://www.pressreader.com/uk/the-scotsman/20150716/281951721499708.
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purchase of hull mounted sonars (HMS) for the Tongyeong salvage and
rescue ship which failed to meet the Navy's required operational capability
(ROC).64

The 2014-2016 anti-corruption campaign has led to several consequences
for practitioners. One noticeable consequence is the considerably reduced
use of agents or consultants (which were seen as a major source of
corruption) when foreign weapons manufacturers sell their products to the
Defense Acquisition Program Administration (DAPA), the Korean
government's military procurement office. Another consequence felt by
practitioners is the tendency by certain DAPA officers to refuse to take any
decision which may be interpreted against them by government auditors,
opting instead to adopt an extremely rigid attitude, thus rendering
negotiation and implementation of defense contracts more difficult.
Another consequence of the anti-corruption campaign has been the
adoption of a very tough and thorough new anti-corruption law, effective
since September 28, 2016, formally called the "Improper Solicitation and
Graft Act" but better known as the "Kim Young Ran Act" (KYR Act), from
the name of the Korean Supreme Court justice who initiated it.65 The KYR
Act applies to a wide scope of targets including not only public officials but
also employees of state-owned enterprises and private media companies,
teachers and employees of private schools, and private individuals
performing public duties.66
Specifically, the KYR Act, which is not specific to the defense industry,
has two major components: (1) prohibition of provision of economic benefits
to a public official; and (2) prohibition of improper solicitation.67 When the
economic benefit is in excess of KRW1,000,000 (approximately U.S. $900)
at a time or KRW3,000,000 (approximately U.S. $2,700) in total in one fiscal
year, provision of such benefit is criminally punished regardless of its
connection with the public official's duties and its motive.68 When the
economic benefit is less than the above amounts and the benefit is given in
relation to the public official's duties, provision of such benefit is punished
by a surcharge regardless of whether it is provided to receive an improper
advantage.69 Interestingly, for the ease of social relations the law provides
for exceptions which reflect widely-practiced traditions of gift giving in
Korean society. Some of the typical exceptions are: (i) food and beverages
64. Former Navy ChiefAcquitted of CorruptionAllegations, KOREA TIMES (Aug. 18, 2016), http:/
2
/www.koreatimes.co.kr/www/news/nation/2016/08/205_ 12195.htrnl.
65. Geumpumdeung Susuni Geumjie Gwanhan Beoblyul [Improper Solicitation and Graft
Act], Act No. 13278, Mar. 27, 2015 (S. Kor.).
66. The term "public official" is defined very broadly in the KYR Act (articles 2 and 11). See
id. arts. 2, 11. In essence, certain individuals vested with a public function or who could be
viewed as such may be considered public officials under the KYR Act. The definition includes
journalists, who are deemed as having the power to influence the public, and thus by extension
exercise a public office.
67. Id. arts. 5, 8.
68. Id. arts. 8(1), 22(1), 22(1)(3).
69. Id. arts. 8(2), 23(5)(1), 23(5)(3).
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worth less than KRW30,000 (U.S. $27), gifts worth less than KRW50,000
(U.S. $45), and congratulatory or condolence money worth less than
KRW100,000 (U.S. $90), unless the food, gift, or money is provided in
return for a favor or to influence the discharge of the public official's duty;
(ii) transportation, accommodation, and food and beverages, that are
uniformly provided by an organizer of an official event related to the duties
of a public official, to all participants to the event; and (iii) souvenirs or
promotional goods distributed to people regardless of their identity.70
"Improper solicitation," in short, means requesting a public official to
discharge his/her duty in violation of the laws, or beyond their authority
granted under the laws.71 In principle, any person engaging in improper
solicitation will be subject to an administrative surcharge regardless of
whether he/she received money for exerting his influence.
The KYR Act has a vicarious liability provision applicable to
corporations.72 Thus, any violation of the KYR Act will subject corporations
to criminal and administrative punishment, unless a corporation can prove it
properly supervised the conduct of its employees so as to prevent such
violation.73
The KYR Act is attracting unprecedented attention both from the Korean
public and from enforcement agencies. Taking this into account, defense
companies doing business in Korea need to update their compliance systems
and guidelines to prevent any unintended entanglement with the KYR Act.
IV.

Increased Enforcement of Anti-Corruption Laws

The global anti-corruption landscape for the balance of 2016 continued
recent years' ratcheting trends. Both United States and international
authorities escalated their enforcement activity. Non-United States
jurisdictions, in particular, witnessed enhanced anti-corruption policy
attention and regulatory activity. An industry initiative led by the
International Organization for Standardization (ISO) resulted in a new
auditable standard for robust industry compliance. The result of the
November 2016 United States election, however, introduces a degree of
uncertainty into the horizon. Given President Trump's stance regarding
deregulation and United States corporate competitiveness, and his own
70. Id. arts. 8(3); Enforcement Decree of the Improper Solicitation and Graft Act, Presidential
Decree No. 27490, Sept. 8, 2016 (S. Kor.).
71. Article 5 of the KYR Act defines 15 actions which constitute improper solicitation. See
Improper Solicitation and Graft Act art. 5. For example, Trading in influence so that dutyrelated confidential information on tender, auction, development, test, patent, military affair,
taxation, etc., is disclosed in violation of statutes; Trading in influence so that a specific
individual, organization, or legal person is selected or rejected as a party to a contract in
violation of statutes related to the contract.
72. Id. art. 24.
73. Before the KYR Act, official bribery and private commercial bribery used to be primarily
governed by the Criminal Act which does not recognize a corporation's vicarious criminal
liability. Therefore, bribery cases led to the punishment of individuals but not corporations.
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experience conducting business in high-risk environments, the ground may
begin to shift for United States priorities in the new year.
Within the United States, the Department of Justice's (DOJ) decision to
create a targeted FCPA enforcement division is beginning to have real
impact, with the DOJ and Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC)
bringing 39 enforcement actions in October 2016-the highest number of
cases in a single year since 2010.74 The cases resolved by the DOJ have

generally been high-dollar, complex cases. The SEC has resolved a higher
volume, but more of these have been against individuals or involved lower
dollar amounts. With the two agencies seemingly focusing their resources in
different, but complementary areas, companies and executives are left with
little room for error.
While United States agencies declined more cases than in previous years
and authorized several deferred prosecution agreements, those individuals
and entities that are charged are facing record-setting penalties. For
example, Och-Ziff Capital Management Group settled with the SEC and
DOJ for $412 million in September for violations of the FCPA's antibribery, books and records, and internal control provisions, marking the first
time a hedge fund has been charged with FCPA violations.75 The fourth
largest FCPA penalty to date stemmed from allegedly improper payments
made by third-party agents of Och-Ziff to government officials of several
African countries.76 Och-Ziff's CEO and CFO also settled charges with the
SEC.77 In another significant action, Embraer settled with the DOJ and
SEC, agreeing to pay a total of $205 million in fines, $98 million of which
represented disgorgement of profits and interest, one of the largest
disgorgements in FCPA enforcement history.78 The Brazilian based airline
manufacturer allegedly made improper payments to win government
contracts in several foreign counties.79
Parallel to the increased cadence of United States enforcement activity,
international anti-corruption efforts accelerated as well. For example,
Brazil's Operation Car Wash, an epic corruption probe, unleashed a
74. In 2010, the SEC and DOJ had a combined 74 FCPA enforcement actions. (This number
was derived from SEC and DOJ websites that list enforcement actions.). See also Kevin Y.
Wang, Valuable Nepotism?: The FCPA and HiringRisks in China, 49 CoLum. J.L. & Soc. PROBS.
460, 466 (2016).
75. Press Release, U.S. Dep't of Justice, Office of Public Affairs, Och-Ziff Capital
Management Admits to Role in Africa Bribery Conspiracies and Agrees to Pay $213 Million
Criminal Fine (Sept. 29, 2016) (on file with the U.S. Dep't of Justice).
76. Id.
77. Press Release, SEC, Och-Ziff Hedge Fund Settles FCPA Charges (Sept. 29, 2016) (on file
with the SEC).
78. Press Release, SEC, Embraer Paying $205 Million to Settle FCPA Charges (Oct. 24,
2016) (on file with the SEC).
79. United States v. Embraer, No. 16-cr-60294-JIC, at A-1 (S.D. Fl. Oct. 24, 2016) (deferred
prosecution agreement); SEC, supra note 77.
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fundamental shock to Brazil's political establishment.o Operation Car Wash
focused on an alleged embezzlement scheme in which businesses bribed
politicians in order to secure inflated government contracts. 81 To date,
numerous senior officials, including two of Brazil's ex-presidents, have been
charged.82 Brazil recently enacted the Clean Company Act in 2014, which
holds companies liable for both domestic and foreign bribery, extending
anti-bribery prohibitions that previously only applied to individuals.83
While Brazil's Congress is currently debating proposed legislation that
would strengthen existing anti-corruption legislation, prosecutors
conducting Operation Car Wash warn that the legislation would also
provide for an "unofficial amnesty" of politicians linked to Operation Car
Wash.84 It is unclear whether the legislation is truly motivated by deterring
future corruption, or insulating those political officials who have engaged in
illegal bribes and might ultimately be caught in Operation Car Wash's net.
The increased attention to anti-corruption issues globally was reflected in
the 2016 publication of ISO 37001 - Anti-bribery Management Systemsan auditable standard articulating international industry best practices in
anti-bribery compliance.85 ISO 37001 contemplates many of the same
elements for assessing the robustness of corporate compliance programs as
those stated in the DOJ and SEC's A Resource Guide to the Foreign
Corrupt Practices Act, issued in November 2012.86 Companies must
implement systems designed to detect, deter, and prevent corruption; riskappropriate policies supported by documented training of all personnel;
automation of recurring compliance processes; credible, independent audits;
a process for identifying, investigating, and correcting violations; and
demonstration of leadership commitment to accountable compliance.87
Companies can become ISO 37001 certified by an independent auditor in
order to demonstrate the credibility of their compliance program and
mitigate the risk of enforcement against the company in the event an
employee or agent is involved in a corruption violation.88
80. Petrobras: Brazil Officials Forced to Give $60m Back, BBC NEws (Nov. 19, 2016), http://
www.bbc.com/news/world-latin-america-38034497.
8 1. Id.
82. Id.
83. Thomaz Favaro & Geert Aalbers, Breaking Open Brazil: Large-Scale CorruptionInvestigation
Persists, Will Expand Across Sectors, FORBES (Aug. 4, 2016), https://www.forbes.com/sites/
riskmap/2016/08/04/breaking-open-brazil-large-scale-corruption-investigation-persists-willexpand-across-sectors/#c778b2920f5d.
84. Car Wash Judge: Amnesty to Corrupt Politicians a Risk to Brazil, Pi~us 55 (Nov. 24, 2016),
http://plus55.com/politics/2016/1 1/amnesty-corrupt-politicians-brazil.
85. INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZAION FOR STANDARDIZATION, ISO: 37001:2016, ANTI-

Bimnnizy MANAGEMENT
86. See U.S. DEiPr o

SYSTEMS

(2016).

JusTIcE & SEC, A REsouRcE GuioE

To Til

FOREIcN CoRRUr-r

PRAcricjes AcT (2012).
87. International Organization for Standardization, supra note 85.
88. Id.
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The result of the United States presidential election may signal a
challenge to current trends. Given the statutory status of the FCPA, DOJ's
institutionalization of enforcement activity with a dedicated division, and the
momentum of current actions, it is unlikely that industry will observe an
immediate shift. But at a policy level, the new administration's focus on deregulation, United States international business competitiveness, and more
public safety-oriented law enforcement priorities may result in a downshift
over time in United States enforcement initiatives. The ultimate impact on
the global anti-corruption environment, however, is unclear.
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